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welfare within the confines of institutions such as the meat industry. Although I argue that Ng is 
wrong not to advocate abolition, I do find his position concerning wild animals to be compelling. 
Anyone who takes the interests of animals seriously should also accept a cautious commitment 
to intervention in the wild. 
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In recent work, economist Yew-Kwang Ng (2016) suggests a number of strategies for improving 
animal welfare. For the most part, his recommendations consist of low-cost, relatively easy to 
implement strategies that would reduce the suffering of animals – specifically domesticated 
animals – without actually challenging the institutions of animal agriculture or animal 
ownership. In other words, Ng adopts an animal welfarist position, rather than a liberationist 
one. Examples of his welfarist suggestions include increasing the minimum legal size of chicken 
cages and outlawing cruel practices such as the use of whips in horse racing. In addition, Ng 
argues that animal welfare advocates will be more effective if, among other things, they focus 
on improving the welfare of farmed animals rather than wild animals. He suggests that since we 
have more contact with farmed animals and are directly responsible for the harms befalling 
them, it will be easier to convince people to help them than to help wild animals. He also claims 
that attempting to assist wild animals may have unexpected ecological consequences.    
 
Thus far, commentators have been critical of both Ng’s welfarism and his stance on wild 
animals. With respect to their criticisms of welfarism in particular, I am broadly sympathetic.1 In 
fact, it seems to me that Ng, as a self-proclaimed utilitarian —that is, someone who thinks right 
action requires the maximization of welfare across individuals2 — should himself reject animal 
                                                          
1 For their criticisms of animal welfarism, see Baker (2016); Bekoff and Pierce (2016); Leadbeater (2016); Marino 
(2016); and Marks (2016). 
2 My description of utilitarianism is, I hope, neutral with respect to the theory’s many variations. Utilitarians disagree 
about many things, including whether we should be concerned with average and not aggregate welfare, expected 
rather than achieved welfare, etc.    
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welfarism.3 Although utilitarians and animal welfarists have in common their concern for the 
reduction of suffering, there are important differences between them. For most utilitarians (at 
least the consistent ones), whether a being has moral status is determined by whether that 
being has subjective interests, that is, whether it feels pain and pleasure and has preferences. As 
such, utilitarians reject the view that the advanced cognitive abilities most animals lack, for 
example, the ability to engage in moral dialogue and critical moral reflection, are prerequisites 
for full moral standing. Animal welfarists, by contrast, tend to hold the view that such cognitive 
abilities are necessary for full moral standing. Though they accord some moral significance to 
the interests of animals, that significance is low enough to be defeated by even trivial human 
interests, for example, whatever interest human beings have in continuing to eat foods they 
have grown accustomed to. It seems to me that if Ng accepts Jonathan Balcombe’s (2010, p. 44) 
claim that the condition on which the applicability of moral concern depends “is not a capacity 
to think, but a capacity to feel” (i.e., sentience), then Ng should also accept that breeding and 
slaughtering animals for the sake of a trivial human interest is a practice that must be abolished, 
at least in the long run.  
 
With respect to wild animals, however, I think Ng’s position is quite compelling. Before I explain 
why, however, some clarification is in order. When Ng claims that our current focus should be 
on improving the welfare of farmed animals rather than wild animals, he isn’t claiming that we 
should ignore the negative impact that human actions are having on wild animals’ habitats.4 In 
fact, Ng notes that with respect to human-caused damage to habitats, our relationship with wild 
animals is similar to our relationship with domesticated animals in that human behavior is 
responsible for the harms befalling them. What Ng is expressing caution about is large-scale 
interventions that aim at reducing the total amount of suffering in the wild, irrespective of its 
causes. He thinks that intervening in natural processes such as the predator-prey relationship or 
wild animal reproduction is desirable in theory, but that it is also ecologically dangerous. On his 
view, we should refrain from large-scale interventions at present, but we should also be 
conducting the research needed to bring the risks of intervention down to an acceptable level.5  
 
Understood in the above manner, I don’t think many animal rights theorists would criticize Ng 
for being inattentive to the interests of wild animals. Quite the opposite: many would claim that 
he’s taking his concern for wild animals’ welfare too far. The prevalent view among animal rights 
theorists is that we should, for the most part, leave wild animals alone. Though we have a duty 
to refrain from hunting and other actions that cause harm, we do not, according to this view, 
have a duty to prevent natural harms such as death by starvation, predation, exposure, etc. 
(Regan 1983, p. 357; Singer 1975, pp. 238-239; Marks 2016).  
 
With respect to the matter of wild animals, however, I think it is Ng who has the more 
consistent position. Just as Ng should acknowledge that we ought to be working towards 
                                                          
3 For his thoughts about utilitarianism, see Ng (2000).  
4 See Leadbeater (2016). For other commentaries where Ng is criticized for being insufficiently mindful of the 
welfare of wild animals, see Baker (2016) and Marino (2016).  
5 For an interview during which Ng discusses his views about wild animals, see Carpendale (2015). For the 
influential article around which much of the interview is focused, see Ng (1995).     
Animal Sentience 2016.085:  Johannsen Commentary on Ng on Animal Suffering 
 
 
3 
abolishing institutions such as the meat industry,6 animal rights theorists should acknowledge 
that their position also requires a hypothetical commitment to intervening in the wild, that is, a 
commitment to intervening in the event that it becomes ecologically safe to do so. Though 
human-caused harms such as habitat destruction are morally different from naturally occurring 
harms, the difference between them is not so great as to justify the claim that we have reason 
to care only about the former and not about the latter. Our duties to avoid harming others are 
especially stringent, but we also owe duties of assistance to those in need when we can help 
them without excessive cost to ourselves or to others. In light of this, a number of authors 
working on issues in animal ethics have accepted that intervening to reduce the amount of 
suffering in nature is morally desirable, so long as we recognize our current lack of knowledge as 
a constraint on our ambitions (McMahan 2010; Horta 2013, 2015; Tomasik 2015). I think Ng 
should be commended for his progressive and yet cautious stance towards suffering in the wild, 
a topic that has only recently begun to attract much philosophical attention.               
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